Say Sorry and Save: A Practical
Argument for a Greater Role for
Apologies in Medical Malpractice Law
Matthew Pillsbury*
I. INTRODUCTION – MAKING A PLACE FOR
APOLOGY IN THE LEGAL LEXICON
“Say you’re sorry!” Thinking of this command may
conjure up the image of an elementary school teacher
admonishing a student for teasing a classmate, or perhaps a
grandmother mediating a broken toy dispute between her two
grandsons. Sadly, one is less likely to think of a lawyer
giving this advice to a client. While television programs such
as Law and Order and Boston Legal beam enough images of
bickering attorneys to make any viewer think that lawyers are
an uncompromising lot, the very real practices of stalling and
procedural stonewalling used by lawyers clog the judicial
arteries with gridlock and delay resolution of legal disputes.
Professor Jonathan Cohen has even argued that the legal
system has made the “immoral the normal” by encouraging
denial over responsibility.1 Apologies have the power to
mend the bruised psyche and yet they are avoided by lawyers
and clients, and in several instances, discouraged by the law.2
This article examines both the potential benefits and
detriments of the use of an apology in a legal setting. This
article uses the specific environment surrounding a medical
malpractice case to help illustrate how and why an apology
should or should not be proffered by the Defendant.
Ultimately, the reader of this article should have a solid
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understanding of how an apology can be admissible as
evidence in the litigation of a medical malpractice lawsuit.
The introduction of apologies as a commonly used legal
tool has the power to revolutionize medical malpractice law.
Research indicates that an apology given by a doctor to a
patient harmed by medical error has beneficial effects for
both parties. 3 Yet, there is a tendency among defendants to
withhold apologies out of the fear that such statements will be
used against them as evidence at trial.4 As legal scholars
Peter H. Rehm and Denise R. Beatty state, “Since an apology
usually can be admitted into evidence, and because some
plaintiffs choose to understand an apology as an admission of
guilt, it seems safest not to apologize.”5 Applying Rehm and
Beatty’s words to the field of medical malpractice law, it can
be seen that before doctors and other health care
professionals can embrace apologies on a wide scale, two
obstacles must be overcome. First, doctors must learn when
the law allows them to apologize without the fear of an
apology returning in the form of evidence against the doctor
at trial. Second, lawmakers must be encouraged to knock
down legal barriers that prevent doctors from apologizing to
patients.
Doctors, hospitals, and other medical professionals may
wonder why they should apologize to patients in the wake of
a harmful medical error. “Because it is the right thing to do”
is the straightforward answer that may come to mind for
subscribers of Cohen’s claims that denial is immoral and
acceptance of responsibility is moral.6 A moral argument can
indeed be made that those who have wronged others should
take responsibility for their actions and accept the
consequences.7 The apology scholar, Aaron Lazare, has
3
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argued that a doctor’s apology is a crucial component in a
patient’s recovery from harm caused by medical error.8
While an apology may never help a harmed patient or his or
her family recover faith in the medical system, the receipt of
an expression of sorrow can help repair the emotional
damage suffered by a patient who trusted a doctor with his
health, or family members who trusted a doctor with the life
of a loved one, only to be gravely disappointed.9 As Lazare
explains: “[P]atients are often ashamed of their illness and
sometimes humiliated by their physicians. Apologies, I have
learned, are perhaps the only way to heal, or at least to
minimize, the harm of humiliations.”10
“Minimizing the harm of humiliations” is indeed a noble
reason for a doctor to give an apology. There is of course the
valid argument that an apology does not repair the physical
damage caused by medical error. Indeed, it would be absurd
to suggest that patients should be forgiving to the point that
they forego all compensation for their injuries caused by
malpractice as long as an apology is received. However,
keeping with Lazare’s line of reasoning, doctors must realize
that while they cannot repair the physical damage of their
mistakes, they can, through an apology, ease the emotional
damage experienced by patients who have been harmed by a
doctor’s mistake.11 People already suffer from feelings of
indignity when they experience health problems that force
them to become patients.12 Trusting in a doctor’s care, only
to later learn that this trust worsened the patient’s injury,
leads to humiliation that only an apology can alleviate.13
Cohen has argued that there is a psychological benefit to
the apologizer in that he will not suffer the inner turmoil
caused by not taking responsibility for harm he has caused to
another person.14 “Getting away with it,” Cohen states, can
8
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have more severe personal ramifications for a wrongdoer
than being held accountable by an “external authority.”15
Since, as Rehm and Beatty have suggested, an apology yields
psychological benefits to both the apologizer and the apology
recipient, and it is unfortunate that fear of legal reprisal often
keeps sorrow from being expressed.16
The numbers themselves provide another argument for a
greater need for apologies within medical malpractice law.17
The Greek physician Hippocrates once said, “Whenever a
doctor cannot do good, he must be kept from doing harm.”18
Even in an era long past, the founder of modern medicine
realized that while doctors have the power to heal, they also
have the ability to worsen a patient’s condition. Doctors,
according to the Hippocratic view, must be allowed to do
what they can to help, and refrain from activity that causes a
patient further harm. In modern times, it appears that
Hippocrates’ words have gone unheeded. A report by the
Institute of Medicine estimates that as many as 98,000 people
die in U.S. hospitals each year as the result of medical
errors.19 Stated differently, nearly 100,000 people a year die
from a mistake committed by a medical worker they trusted
their lives to. This staggering figure alone supports the
position that there is a moral argument that doctors should
apologize for their mistakes, and the removal of these legal
barriers to apologies is essential. With patients dying at such
a rapid rate due to medical error, the medical profession as a
whole has a duty to take responsibility, explain how
individual errors were made, and determine how such errors
can be avoided in the future.
15
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An apology may be the right thing to do, but the
unfortunate, yet realistic, truth is that members of the medical
profession, being part of a multi-million dollar industry, do
not have an incentive to embrace apologies until they can be
convinced that apologizing is the financially beneficial thing
to do.20 Promoting the morality behind acceptance of
responsibility is a lofty goal. On the other hand, individual
doctors or hospitals facing potential costly verdicts may
understandably decide that fiscal solvency outranks morality.
Accordingly, before apologies can ever become an accepted
part of the medical malpractice lawyer’s legal toolbox, the
following two assertions must be examined thoroughly: 1. in
situations where the law does not treat an apology as
admissible evidence, an apology is in the doctor’s and
patient’s best financial interest; 2. as for situations where the
law does treat an apology as admissible evidence, lawmakers
have an opportunity to make changes that will financially
benefit both doctors and patients.
II. THE FIRST ASSERTION: INADMISSIBLE
APOLOGIES
Utilizing a review of how the law of evidence applies to
apologies, doctors will gain a better understanding of when
they can freely apologize without the fear of legal liability.
In contrast, they will also learn that in certain situations, an
apology is unprotected by the law and it could return in the
form of evidence against them. Since research indicates that
there is a correlation between apologies and better settlements
for the apologizer, it is in the best interest of parties faced
with a medical malpractice lawsuit to learn to recognize when
they should and should not apologize.21
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A. HOW APOLOGIES ARE AFFECTED BY THE
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide rules that apply to
a variety of different statements, including apologies.22 The
“hearsay” rules, Fed. R. Evid. 800, and two rules that limit
the admissibility of relevant evidence, Fed R. Evid 408 and
Fed. R. Evid. 409, are of particular interest to the issue of
when apologies are admissible against defendant doctors in
medical malpractice actions.
i. HEARSAY EVIDENCE
The Federal definition of the term hearsay is “a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.”23 In less complex terms, as a general rule,
whatever is said outside of the courtroom cannot be offered
as testimonial evidence inside the courtroom.24 Without
delving further into the issue, one might therefore assume that
a doctor is free to apologize “ad nauseum” to his patient
without fear of legal reprisal, as long as he apologizes
anywhere but inside the courtroom. However, due to the
many exceptions to the hearsay rule that allow otherwise
inadmissible out of court statements to be admitted into
evidence, this assumption is an incorrect one.
One exception to the hearsay rule allows admissions by
party opponents to be admitted into evidence against the
opposing party.25 This rule includes statements by an
opponent, as well as the agents or other representatives of an
22
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opponent.26 When applied to a medical malpractice case, this
exception to the rule renders a doctor’s out of court apology
admissible against the doctor, and potentially the health care
organization the doctor is employed by. By apologizing, the
doctor has admitted to wrongdoing, and the apology cannot
be kept out of court using the hearsay rule.27
ii. LIMITS TO RELEVANT EVIDENCE
Only relevant evidence may be admitted at trial.28
Relevant evidence is defined as evidence that tends to make a
“fact of consequence to the determination of the action” more
or less likely than it would be without the evidence.29 If a
piece of evidence makes it likely that a crucial point in the
case occurred or did not occur, then the evidence is relevant
and admissible.30 In many respects, this rule provides
efficiency to the trial process. Perhaps a plaintiff wishes to
introduce evidence in a medical malpractice case that the
defendant doctor has a bad temper and routinely shouts
obscenities at the hospital staff. Although, this evidence
would most likely bring the defendant into disfavor with the
jury, it does not make it more likely than not that the doctor
committed a medical error upon treatment of the patient.
Unless the plaintiff can show that the doctor’s temper led to
the medical error, a court will not admit this evidence. The
Federal Rules of Evidence embrace the notion that trials are
to be won on the merits of the case and are not to descend
into a popularity contest.31
What is the potential result if a doctor makes an attempt
to settle a malpractice case? From a quick glance at the rules
of evidence, one might assume that if a doctor apologizes
while attempting to settle a case, such statements would be
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relevant and admissible against the doctor.32 Thus, the
plaintiff could argue that a doctor would not offer to settle or
apologize if he had not committed any medical error, and
accordingly, the doctor’s apology should be admitted as
evidence of medical error.33 However, to prevent the clogging
of judicial arteries with cases that could be disposed of
through settlement, there is an exception to the relevant
evidence rule with regard to settlement negotiations.34 When
dealing with a legal dispute that has already arisen, evidence
of “compromise or offers to compromise,” which includes
evidence of an offer to settle a case, is inadmissible.35 This
inadmissibility shield extends not only to the settlement offer,
but to any statements made by the parties during the
settlement negotiations.36
With respect to a medical malpractice dispute, the key
problem with the “compromise” exception is that a doctor’s
apology is only protected once a legal dispute arises.37
Effectively, the doctor who wishes to apologize for an error
must wait, in order to avoid the admission of his apology as
evidence, until the patient threatens to sue him.38 The doctor
who recognizes his mistake early on and takes the initiative
of offering a settlement before the patient threatens legal
action is punished in that his statements, including apologies,
will be admissible evidence.39
Turning once more to Fed. R. Evid. 401, there is another
exception to the hearsay rule in the area of offers to pay
medical expenses.40 It could be argued that a doctor’s offer
to pay a patient’s medical expenses should be admissible
under the theory that a doctor would not pay for expenses that
he did not cause, thus making it more likely than not that he
32
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or she caused the additional expenses.41 This argument,
however, would fail under Fed. R. Evid. 409, which protects
the action of a defendant paying or offering to pay for
medical expenses from admissibility.42 This rule specifically
states: “[E]vidence of furnishing or offering or promising to
pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses occasioned by an
injury is not admissible to prove liability for the injury.” 43
When this rule is broken down, it can be seen that a
doctor who offers to pay the medical bills of a patient who
has been harmed by his or her conduct does not have to fear
that evidence of this offer will be admitted against them.
Unlike the compromise exception of Fed. R. Evid. 408, a
doctor may freely offer, without fear, to pay for medical
expenses even before a legal dispute arises.44 However, Fed.
R. Evid. 409 lacks the protection that Fed. R. Evid. 401 gives
to certain additional statements.45 Doctors must be advised
that while they may freely pay for medical expenses before a
legal dispute arises, an apology under these circumstances
can be admissible in court.46 To illustrate, imagine a doctor
stating, “I would like to pay for your medical bills. I’m sorry
I made an improper incision during your operation.” Under
Fed. R. Evid. 409, the first statement would be inadmissible,
but the second statement, made before a legal dispute and
outside of settlement negotiations, is not protected and is
admissible.47
iii. APOLOGIES INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF
SETTLEMENT ACCEPTANCE
During settlement negotiations, doctors may feel free to
apologize for anything and everything they feel responsible
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for and not worry about the attachment of evidentiary value.48
Yet, a reasonable question to be asked is, “Why take the
chance?” As Rehm and Beatty have argued, defendants fear
apologizing and plaintiffs often attempt to turn an apology
against the apologizer.49 A doctor, hospital administrator, or
other medical professional may simply decide the safest
option is to offer a sum of money to make the case disappear,
but refuse to apologize in fear of making the situation
worse.50
According to the research of legal scholar Jennifer K.
Robbenolt, taking the “no apology” approach during
settlement negotiations is unwise.51 Robbenolt discusses the
results of a study in which participants were asked to
essentially “step into the shoes” of a person injured in a
pedestrian-bicycle accident.52 The study called for the
participants to log on to a website, read a scenario, and then
answer questions.53 Among the participants, the scenarios
varied with different information given regarding the
opponent’s apology, or lack thereof.54 The results created an
intriguing window into how apologies can impact the
acceptance of proposed settlement offers.55 As Robbenolt
reported:
When no apology was offered 52% of
respondents indicated that they would
definitely or probably accept the offer, while
43% would definitely or probably reject the
offer and 5% were unsure. When a partial
apology was offered, only 35% of respondents
were inclined to accept the offer, 25% were
48
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inclined to reject it, and 40% indicated that
they were unsure. In contrast, when a full
apology was offered, 73% of respondents were
inclined to accept the offer, with only 13-14%
each inclined to reject it or remaining unsure.56
This study indicates that there is a correlation between
apologies and willingness to settle.57 While only half of the
participants were willing to accept the proposed settlement
offer without an apology, three-fourths of the participants
accepted the offer when a full apology was given. 58
Interestingly, while the study shows that a full apology
carries the best chance of a settlement acceptance, one is
actually better off not to apologize at all rather than give a
partial apology.59 Only thirty-five percent of those surveyed
were willing to accept a settlement when faced with an
expression of sorrow that did not encompass the entire
situation. 60 Moreover, this study indicates that no apology,
or worse yet, a partial apology, or one that appears less than
fully sincere, leads to a decreased likelihood of settlement. 61
Increased feelings of sympathy and decreased feelings of
anger were generated by a full apology.
As Robbenolt
stated:
While an offender offering a full apology was
seen as believing that he or she was more
responsible for the incident than one who
offered a partial or no apology, the conduct of
the full apologizer was judged more favorably
than that of offenders who offered either a
partial or no apology.62
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Robbenolt’s research generates a clear rule for parties to
consider in their settlement negotiations. A full apology
increases the chances that a settlement will be accepted while
no apology or a partial apology decreases the chances of a
settlement. 63 Overall, these results demonstrate the ability of
a full apology to elicit a compassionate feeling of forgiveness
in the plaintiff leading to an increased likelihood to accept a
settlement offer.64 Conversely, they also demonstrate how
anger over a failure to accept responsibility can reduce the
possibility of settlement.65
These results are open to criticism in that mere
participants reading a scenario on a computer screen will
react differently than someone with an actual injury.
Someone with only a hypothetical injury may be more
willing to forgive than a party with a real injury. However,
despite this criticism, the study shows that there is, at least, a
stronger likelihood of settlement acceptance when a full
apology is rendered.66 In other words, one who apologizes
during settlement negotiations has nothing to lose and
everything to gain. The best possible result is that the
plaintiff, feeling compassion as a result of the apology, may
be willing to settle the case for an amount much lower than
the cost of a trial and subsequent finding of liability against
the defendant. 67 In the case of a less forgiving plaintiff, Fed.
R. Evid. 408 prevents statements made during settlement
negotiations from being admissible at trial, meaning the
apologizing party need not fear the possibility that the
apology will be used as evidence against him. Indeed, a party
who feels he has not made an error may reject on principle
the concept of apologizing for the sake of settlement.
However, based on Robbenolt’s research, one who feels
comfortable giving an apology should be strongly encouraged
by his attorney to do so within the context of settlement
63
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negotiations.68 Apologizing during settlement negotiations is
a “win-win” situation. In doing so, the defendant stands a
better chance of having his settlement offer accepted, but will
still be protected against the opponent who refuses to settle
and wishes to use the apology as evidence at trial.69
iv. SELF-HELP: THE SORRY WORKS METHOD
Robbenolt’s research supports the concept that it is in
one’s best financial interest to apologize for wrongdoing
during settlement negotiations.70 The Sorry Works Coalition
has taken this concept a step further with the proposition that
hospitals should adopt a policy of full disclosure when
dealing with medical errors.71 As intriguing as an argument
based on the likelihood of better settlements may be, the
research of this lobbying organization reveals actual evidence
of financial savings stemming from a policy that embraces
the expression of remorse.72
Under the Sorry Works approach, hospitals are to conduct
an internal review of all medical errors.73 If hospital
representatives determine that a medical error stemmed from
a failure to adhere to the requisite standard of care, then the
hospital is to contact the patient, seek settlement, apologize
for the mistake, and answer the patient’s questions openly.74
If the hospital has not engaged in activity that fell below the
standard of care, hospital representatives are still required
communicate with the patient and be forthcoming with
68
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information requests from patients wishing to know more
about how they were harmed.75 A critic might wonder why a
hospital representative would communicate with a patient at
all if the hospital has not done anything wrong. The Sorry
Works Coalition explains that in such cases being honest with
patients relieves them of the suspicion that a cover-up has
taken place, reducing the likelihood of a lawsuit filed in an
attempt to learn more about the medical error through
discovery.76
Two hospitals have adopted this full disclosure approach
and experienced great savings in legal fees according to the
coalition.77 During the 1980s, the Veteran’s Administration
Hospital in Lexington, KY was the first to adopt the approach
that would later become the cornerstone of the Sorry Works
movement.78 After initiating the program, the hospital saw
significant results when it came to settlements.79 Within a
seven year period after initiating the program, the Lexington
Veterans Hospital’s average payment per settlement dropped
to $16,000, compared to the average of a $98,000 payout per
settlement for other VA hospitals nationwide at the time.80
In another situation, after adopting the full-disclosure
approach, the University of Michigan hospital system
reported a significant reduction in legal costs as well.81 The
number of pending lawsuits against the Michigan hospital
system was cut by half.82 In addition, the defense litigation
costs dropped from an average of $65,000 per case to
$35,000 per case, which the hospital maintains has led to a
total savings of $2 million a year.83
75
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The figures reported by these hospitals demonstrate that
by embracing apology as a remedy, hospitals benefit from
reduced legal costs. These examples lead use to imagine the
cost savings that could be realized if apologies were
embraced and encouraged in medical malpractice law on a
nationwide scale. Sorry Works attributes these savings to a
multitude of factors benefiting both the defendant and the
plaintiff.84 Plaintiffs benefit in reduced legal fees as they do
not have to expend large sums of money in the search of how
their medical care went awry.85 Instead, the doctor or
hospital, the parties with the most information of what went
wrong, supplies it.86 In turn, hospitals save legal costs by
avoiding protracted legal battles over information the patient
is likely to gain anyway during the discovery process.87 A
common practice in medical malpractice law is to name
several doctors as defendants who turn out later to be
vindicated simply because the plaintiff was unable to
determine at the time of filing which specific doctor caused
the harm.88 Therefore, a full disclosure approach protects
doctors who have committed no error from being named as
defendants.89
Ultimately, medical professionals, by
apologizing up front and taking responsibility, are able to
benefit by convincing a patient that responsibility has been
accepted, no “cover up” is being engaged in, and a reasonable
settlement to compensate the patient’s injuries can be reached
without moving forward to trial.90
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Plaintiffs and patients are not the only ones to benefit
from an apology policy. Medical malpractice trial lawyers
benefit as well.91 Sorry Works reports that when working on
medical malpractice cases on a contingency basis, lawyers
often front between $50,000 and $500,000 with only a thirtythree percent chance of a successful outcome.92 Seventyseven percent of lawyers expend large sums of money and
effort without a financial reward in the end.93 A full
disclosure policy of apology results in a ninety-five percent
success rate, with cases being resolved between two and six
months.94 Lawyers do not have to suffer through years of
having cash tied up in cases that may never result in a
profit.95
III. THE SECOND ASSERTION: CHANGING THE
LAW IN SITUATIONS WHERE APOLOGIES ARE
ADMISSIBLE
When a medical professional apologizes outside the
context of settlement negotiations, his apology is fair game
and can be used as evidence against him at trial.96 As the
research of Sorry Works has shown, significant savings in
legal fees result from a policy that embraces apology.97 In
light of these findings, judges and legislators have an
opportunity to change the law in ways that encourage
apologies even before a plaintiff raises the lawsuit specter.
Judges must be encouraged to follow the example of the
Vermont Supreme Court in preventing a doctor’s apology to
be used as the sole evidence of a deviation from the standard

91
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of care.98 Lawmakers interested in changing the evidentiary
laws of their individual states can obtain guidance by
analyzing what other states have accomplished in this area.
A. CASE LAW ANALYSIS: PREVENTING A DOCTOR’S
APOLOGY FROM BEING THE SOLE EVIDENCE OF
DEVIATION FROM THE STANDARD OF CARE
i. DEFINING THE STANDARD OF CARE
A successful medical malpractice action usually requires
the existence of three factors: “(1) a duty of care on the part
of the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a violation of that duty
through a failure to conform to the requisite standard; and (3)
causation of the injury resulting from that failure.”99 Medical
malpractice actions are negligence based claims and
accordingly establish what level of care a doctor is to
provide, and whether there was a deviation from that level of
care.100 These are crucial points that, if left unproven, could
lead to a loss for the plaintiff.
The individual states have the power to set forth what
standard a doctor practicing within the state will be held to.101
For example, in Palandjian v. Foster, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts explained the standard of care that
doctors in Massachusetts are to follow.102 In doing so, the
court distinguished between what is required of general
practitioners versus what is expected of doctors who
specialize in a particular field of medicine:
“The proper standard is whether the physician,
if a general practitioner, has exercised the
degree of care and skill of the average
qualified practitioner, taking into account the
98
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advances in the profession . . . . [A] specialist
should be held to the standard of care and skill
of the average member of the profession
practising [practicing] the specialty, taking
into account the advances in the profession.”
Because the standard of care is based on the
care that the average qualified physician
would provide in similar circumstances, the
actions that a particular physician, no matter
how skilled, would have taken are not
determinative.103
Here, the Supreme Judicial Court set forth an objective
standard of care for doctors to follow.104 This language
recognizes the fact that while medicine is not an exact
science, there is a certain level of competency that all doctors
must display in their work.105 Indeed, there are doctors who
strive beyond what is considered “average” in their
profession.106 However, under the Supreme Judicial Court’s
opinion, the fact that a more diligent than usual doctor would
take notice of a possible error and prevent its occurrence is of
no consequence.107 While doctors with exceptionally high
skills are to be applauded, the appropriate inquiry is how the
average doctor practicing in that particular field of medicine
would have reacted under the same set of circumstances.108
A doctor will be held liable only if he fails to meet the
standard applied to all doctors in the given field, but will not
be held liable for failing to achieve above average results in
his practice.109
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ii. SENESAC AS A BREAKTHROUGH IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE LAW
In states that promote this objective standard, there is a
danger that courts will be persuaded to allow a doctor’s
apology for an alleged mistake to be admitted as evidence of
the doctor’s deviation from the requisite standard of care.110
However, the Supreme Court of Vermont became a pioneer
in the realm of medical malpractice law by rejecting the
admission of a doctor’s apology as the main evidence of the
doctor’s deviation from the standard of care.111
The facts of the Senesac case reveal a story of a
physician’s error and her subsequent apology.112 In 1973, the
plaintiff, Mary Senesac, underwent a therapeutic abortion
performed by the defendant, Associates in Obstetrics and
Gynecology, through its doctor, Mary Jane Grey.113 During
the operation, the plaintiff’s uterus was perforated, requiring
plaintiff to undergo an emergency hysterectomy.114 The
plaintiff filed suit, and a key issue at trial was the legal effect
of Dr. Grey’s statement during cross-examination that she
“made a mistake, she was sorry, and it [the perforation of the
uterus] had never happened before.”115 At the close of the
plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant successfully argued a
motion for a directed verdict, based on the failure of the
plaintiff to introduce expert testimony regarding an alleged
deviation from the proper standard of care on the defendant’s
part.116 The plaintiff appealed, arguing that Dr. Grey’s
apology and admission of a personal mistake was sufficient
for the jury to determine that the doctor had deviated from
the governing standard of care.117 The Supreme Court of
Vermont disagreed by holding that Dr. Grey’s apology:
110
111

See supra text accompanying note 90.
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Does not establish a departure from the
standard of care ordinarily exercised by a
reasonably skillful gynecologist. The fact the
physician may have believed, and, if so,
verbalized the belief that her performance was
not in accordance with her own personal
standards of care and skill, is not sufficient in
the absence of expert medical evidence
showing a departure from the standards of care
and skill ordinarily exercised by physicians in
similar cases.118
An intriguing rule of law was generated by Senesac.119
The Supreme Court of Vermont determined that a doctor’s
apology was not sufficient on its own to hold a doctor liable
for medical malpractice.120 Dr. Grey admitted she made a
mistake, and that in her experience of performing abortions,
uteruses were not normally perforated.121 In other words, Dr.
Grey’s words only established that she deviated from her
personal standard of care, that she made a mistake she did not
normally make.122 To prevail, the plaintiff needed expert
testimony showing that Dr. Grey’s mistake in this particular
case showed conduct that fell below the overall standard of
care that she, as a member of a greater medical community,
was required to follow.123 It was not enough to show that Dr.
Grey made a mistake that she did not normally make.124 The
plaintiff needed to show, through expert testimony, that Dr.
Grey made a mistake that most reasonably skilled
gynecologists did not make.125
118
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According to Rehm and Beatty, the result of Senesac was
that a doctor’s apology became a legal nullity in terms of
evidentiary value.126 In an analysis of Senesac, they argued:
This case appears to say that plaintiffs,
supposedly armed with an apology, must
prove their cases just as if the apology did not
exist. A mere apology does not prove any of
the elements of the case because evidence
about particular medical facts or events is still
missing from the plaintiff's case. Since a mere
apology pertains to a doctor's self-image and
feelings, it is not evidence of any particular
medical fact or event. This leaves the plaintiff
legally in the same position as one who did not
receive an apology.127
Courts across the country should be encouraged to follow
the Senesac example. Medical malpractice liability should
only be imposed when a plaintiff provides sufficient evidence
of deviation from the requisite standard of care.128 A doctor’s
apology, at most, is an expression of the doctor’s remorse at
an undesirable result or his personal opinion that his conduct
amounted to a mistake.129 An apology may be relevant to the
question of whether the standard of care was deviated from,
but should not be the sole decisive factor.130 The appropriate
inquiry is not whether the individual doctor believes he has
committed a wrong, but whether, in light of the standard of
care that he is required to comport his conduct to, his action
was unreasonable.131 If the plaintiff is unable to procure such
evidence, typically in the form of expert testimony, then a
mere doctor’s apology should not be allowed to become a
legal “trump card” of sorts, allowing the plaintiff to abandon
126
127
128
129
130
131
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the deviation of care standard and simply rest his case on a
doctor’s expression of sympathy.132 To allow this would be
to punish the doctor who gives an honest opinion of how a
medical mistake was made.133
Senesac was expanded upon by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in Phinney v. Vinson.134 In this case, plaintiff
Robert Phinney underwent a transurethral resection of the
prostate, performed by the defendant, Dr. Robert Vinson.135
Significant pain following the procedure caused the plaintiff
to see another doctor, who determined that the operation was
“inadequate.”136 Dr. Vinson told the plaintiff that he had
been informed by the second doctor “that he had performed
an ‘inadequate resection’ and he apologized . . . ‘for his
failure to do so’.”137
Like the plaintiff in Senesac, Phinney attempted to base
his case solely on Dr. Vinson’s apology as evidence that the
doctor fell below the requisite standard of care.138 Again, the
court ruled that a personal apology is not enough to prove
that the doctor failed to meet the requisite standard of care,
and that further evidence, typically in the form of expert
testimony, would be needed.139
Cases such as Senesac and Phinney recognize that the
practice of medicine, despite modern advances, is not an
exact science.140 It is possible, and even reasonable, for
certain mistakes to be made. Without the benefit of medical
training, the jury must be given evidence from an expert that
explains what the defendant doctor did, why the doctor’s
action fell below the appropriate standard of care, and why

132
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the doctor’s action was not simply an uncommon, nonnegligent mistake. Rehm and Beatty argue:
The lesson Phinney teaches is how difficult it
is for a plaintiff to win based on an apology
alone. It appears safe for a practitioner to
apologize for an inadequate outcome or result,
as long as there is no admission that the
inadequate outcome was caused by the
practioner's [sic] negligence. It appears that
there is an understanding that the result of an
operation is not guaranteed, not every
operation will be successful, and an apology
for the inadequacy of an operation does not
mean the doctor is liable for negligence. This
is a practical precedent in that it allows a
doctor to express sympathy or empathy,
without fear of reprisal, when the result of a
procedure is not as good as was hoped for.
Such expressions usually help heal the feelings
and relationships of all persons involved.141
Courts across the country are well-advised to continue
with the Senesac-Phinney line of reasoning when it comes to
medical malpractice cases. As these cases illustrate, a doctor
may apologize to a patient for any number of reasons,
ranging from personal sympathy to regret stemming from a
belief that a mistake has been made. While perfection is
often hoped for from a doctor’s work, the practice of
medicine is never completely devoid of error. The mere
recognition by the doctor that he made a mistake should not
be enough to hold a doctor liable in a medical malpractice
action. The key inquiry, to come typically from expert
testimony, is whether the mistake made is one that is not
unusual within the medical field and thus excusable, or if it is
one that shows a failure on the doctor’s part to perform in
accordance with the requisite standard of care.
141
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iii. EXPANDING ON SENESAC: WHEN AN
APOLOGY PROVIDES MORE THAN A SIMPLE
“I’M SORRY”
What if a doctor makes a statement that provides, in
addition to an expression of sorrow, clearer evidence of a
deviation from the standard of care? The Supreme Court of
Michigan was faced with such a case.142 Unlike the simple
apology made by Dr. Grey in Senesac, the defendant in
Pachtman, Dr. Judith Pachtman, made statements to a
patient’s family member that she knew she had used a needle
that was “too small.”143 The needle broke inside the patient’s
muscle tissue, causing doctors to search for it for twenty
minutes.144 The majority of the court determined that this
statement on its own was insufficient to establish a prima
facie case of medical malpractice.145
The Pachtman dissent, written by Justice Charles Levin,
provides a better compromise.146 Justice Levin pointed to
Senesac as an example of a case where the doctor’s statement
did not “explain with relative precision what the physician
should have done.”147 Justice Levin added that an Idaho case
provided another example of a doctor’s expression of error
that did not provide sufficient evidence to impose legal
liability.148 Justice Levin argued that in Maxwell, the Idaho
Supreme Court correctly determined that malpractice liability
cannot be imposed upon a doctor for his simple statement that
he “obviously messed up.”149 Justice Levin pointed to a third
case out of California, where a doctor’s statement that he
142
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“blamed himself” for the patient being in the hospital was
insufficient to show deviation from the standard of care.150
Justice Levin agreed that simple statements of sorrow are
not enough to show deviation from the standard of care, but
the statement of the physician in Pachtman was more
complex.151 In admitting that she “knew” the needle she was
using was “too small,” in Levin’s opinion, Dr. Pachtman
provided evidence that there was a standard practice of
needle usage in the medical community, the doctor was aware
of this practice, yet knowingly went against it.152
Indeed, simple apologies should not be allowed as
evidence of a deviation from the standard of care. Highly
non-technical expressions such as “I messed up” or “I blame
myself” should not be the sole basis on which liability for
medical malpractice is imposed. However, Justice Levin
makes a strong argument that statements that go beyond
simple apologies and provide evidence of unreasonable error
should be admissible.153 Dr. Pachtman’s words indicated that
in her field of medicine, there was a properly sized needle to
use for that particular procedure, and that she knew she did
not have the proper size, but she went forward using the
Dr. Pachtman effectively
improper needle anyway.154
became an expert against herself as her words established a
standard of care in regard to needle usage and a
corresponding failure to adhere to it.155
The Supreme Court of Michigan disagreed with the
dissent, and in doing so, effectively decided it would be
unfair to punish Dr. Pachtman for vocalizing her mistakes by
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making her words the main basis for establishing liability.156
Justice Levin made a valid argument in that, while simple
apologies should be protected, more complex statements
involving clear evidence should be admissible.157 Given the
impact of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and its
state counterparts, doctors should be forewarned that in
speaking outside of settlement negotiations, the more detailed
an apology is, the more evidence it provides.158
B. LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS: ENCOURAGING
LAWMAKERS TO PROTECT APOLOGIES FROM
ADMISSIBILITY
The Senesac case achieved much in the way of preventing
apologies from becoming admissible evidence.159 Yet, even
in following the Senesac line of reasoning, courts cannot
completely wipe out apologies at trial.160 As seen in the
Pachtman dissent, there is a dispute among legal minds when
it comes to the treatment of detailed versus simple
apologies.161 Moreover, Senesac does not keep an apology
out altogether.162 Senesac merely limits the apology from
becoming the sole evidence for finding liability against a
physician defendant.163
Courts can only do so much, as the task of clarifying the
evidentiary value to be attached to doctor’s apologies is the
156
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duty for state and federal legislators. Several states have
created laws that protect apologies from being admissible
against the doctor/apologizer at trial.164
Generally, there are two types of apology protection
laws.165 Both typically protect apologies from being used as
evidence against the apologizing doctor.166 The main
difference between them is whether the doctor is legally
mandated to disclose details regarding medical errors.167
i. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE LAWS
Approximately five states have “mandatory disclosure”
laws, meaning that the hospital has no choice when it comes
Nevada’s mandatory
to disclosing medical errors.168
disclosure law for hospitals is one example.169 Under the
Nevada law, medical errors are referred to as “sentinel
events” and each hospital must designate a representative
who is required to notify a patient of the details behind a
sentinel event within seven days of its occurrence.170 This
notification, being a legal duty, is not an acknowledgement or
admission of liability under the Nevada law.171
Pennsylvania’s mandatory disclosure law provides more
detail than the Nevada law.172 The Pennsylvania law requires
all health care workers, when they reasonably believe a
“serious incident” has occurred, to report that incident
according to the hospital’s safety plan.173 The hospital then
164
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has a duty to report the event to the patient.174 The law
extends “whistleblower” protection to the health care worker
by preventing the hospital from taking retaliatory actions
against the health care worker for reporting the event.175
The problem with the Nevada and Pennsylvania laws is
that they state the legal duties of hospitals in terms that are
general and open to interpretation. For example, under the
Nevada law, hospitals must report on “sentinel events,” but
the law does not state what exactly the hospital representative
must tell the patient about the event.176 Pennsylvania leaves
it up to the health care worker to designate what to disclose
and arguably, a great deal of interpretation comes in to play if
the standard is determined by what the health care worker
believes to be “serious.”177
If states are going to impose a burden of mandatory
reporting, then hospitals should be given clear instructions on
what they are to report.
New Jersey provides a
comprehensive statute, complete with definitions of key
terms.178 This statute defines an “adverse event” as “a
negative consequence of care that results in unintended injury
or illness, which may or may not have been preventable.”179
New Jersey hospital workers thus have a clearer standard on
which to guide them.180 Interestingly, while the law’s
definition of adverse events incorporates preventable events,
the law also states that health care facilities must report
“preventable adverse events.”181 Specifically, facilities must
report these events to patients and to the State Department of
Human Services.182 Health care workers are encouraged to
report adverse events not covered by the law to the
department and are protected from retaliatory action for doing
174
175
176
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180
181
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so.183 The law goes on to provide a complex explanation of
when documents and other information created during the
mandatory reporting process can and cannot be used as
evidence.184
ii. NON-MANDATORY APOLOGY PROTECTION
LAWS
Roughly twenty-nine states have apology laws that
protect expressions of sympathy or sorrow from being used
as evidence against the apologizer.185 States vary in whether
protection is given to those involved solely with medical
errors or to other non-medical incidents. Massachusetts was
the first state in the nation to provide an apology protection
law. The Massachusetts apology protection statute, which
applies to all accidents and not simply those of a medical
nature, reads:
Statements, writings or benevolent gestures
expressing sympathy or a general sense of
benevolence relating to the pain, suffering or
death of a person involved in an accident and
made to such person or to the family of such
person shall be inadmissible as evidence of an
admission of liability in a civil action.186
The statute is relatively short, but it says a great deal. It
allows a person who has caused an accident to apologize
without fear of that apology being used as evidence against
him.187 This law denies admissibility to an apology whether
the apologizer was indeed at fault or even if he merely gave
an apology based on human emotions that arise from being
involved in a disturbing accident.188 Laws such as the one in
183
184
185
186
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188
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Massachusetts do not prevent an accident victim from
suing.189 Instead, they ensure that the victim will prove his
case through actual evidence of the defendant’s wrongdoing,
and not based simply on an apology.190
IV. CONCLUSION: AN OVERALL NEED FOR
APOLOGIES IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW
Apologizing to a patient harmed by a medical error is the
moral thing for a doctor to do. Yet, there is an overwhelming
fear among doctors that while saying “I’m sorry” is the right
thing to do, an apology could turn costly as well. From
reviewing the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the research of
Robbenolt and the Sorry Works Coalition, it is shown that
doctors need not fear apologizing during settlement
negotiations, and doing so leads to a stronger likelihood that a
patient will accept a proposed settlement rather than seek a
costly trial. As for situations where apologies are admissible,
courts and lawmakers across the country can learn from the
strides made by their counterparts in other states.
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